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Abstract 
We use a new partial-equilibrium, multi-market international model to analyze trade 
and agricultural policies affecting markets for peanut/groundnut products. The model 
covers four goods in thirteen countries/regions, including a large set of developing 
countries. Welfare is evaluated by looking at consumers’ equivalent variation, quasi-
profits in farming, quasi-profits in crushing, and taxpayers’ revenues and outlays implied 
by distortions. We calibrate the model on recent historical data and current policy 
information. We analyze several groundnut trade liberalization scenarios in deviation 
from the recent historical baseline. Trade liberalization in groundnut markets has a strong 
South-South dimension, opposing India and, to a lesser extent, China to smaller 
developing countries mainly located in Africa. In the former, current policies, 
exacerbated by their market size, depress the world prices of groundnut products. Under 
free trade, African exporters present in these world markets would gain because they are 
net sellers of groundnut products. In India, consumers would be better off, with lower 
consumer prices resulting from the removal of prohibitive tariffs and large imports of 
groundnut products. The cost of the adjustment would fall on Indian farmers and 
crushers. In China, crush margins would improve because of the large terms-of-trade 
effects in the oil market relative to the seed market. China’s groundnut product exports 
would expand dramatically. Net buyers of groundnut products in OECD (Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development) countries would be worse off. We draw 
implications for Doha negotiations. 
 
Keywords: distortion, Doha, groundnuts, negotiations, oil, peanut, protection, trade 
liberalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Groundnut Trade Liberalization: A South-South Debate? 
Introduction 
Until 2002, the former policy debate on groundnut/peanut1 markets was always 
conducted in a North-South context, where U.S. farm and trade policies severely 
distorted world markets, causing large inefficiencies. Distortions in the South were often 
overlooked in that debate. Radical reforms under the 2002 U.S. farm bill have removed 
the worst features of the former U.S. peanut program. Trade barriers were an essential 
pillar of the former U.S. peanut program, which generously subsidized U.S. growers. 
With a system of supply controls and price discrimination, U.S. farmers received a very 
high price for “food” peanuts on infra-marginal output (a rectangle of rents) but received 
a lower price equal to the world price at the margin for peanuts that had to be exported.2 
This scheme was made feasible only by limiting imports to minimum levels to force U.S. 
food processors to buy domestic “food” peanuts. The U.S. government restricted imports 
through tight tariff-rate quotas under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(URAA).  
The policy shift was caused by trade liberalization under NAFTA (North American 
Free Trade Agreement), which acted as a disciplining device for U.S. domestic policies. 
As part of its NAFTA obligations, the United States has had to increase the tariff rate 
quota (TRQ) gradually for groundnut imports from NAFTA members. The rising imports 
undermined the domestic price discrimination scheme, as cheaper peanut imports started 
competing with high-price domestic food peanuts.  
As we show later in the paper, the current U.S. policy is a minor source of distortion 
in world groundnut markets.3 This policy change in the North has brought forth 
significant distortions within the South, and the new policy debate in groundnut markets 
is occurring in a South-South context, hence our title. Trade liberalization in groundnut 
product markets now opposes vested interest in India and, to a lesser extent, China to 
income generation in smaller developing countries, especially in Africa—and thus the 
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potential rift within the South. The heterogeneity of interests within the South is all too 
present in these markets. India’s policies are nearly prohibitive in all markets, whereas 
China protects processed product markets, although it is a natural exporter of groundnuts. 
The size of these two countries magnifies their distortions, which substantially depress 
the world prices of the three traded commodities considered in our analysis. These 
distortions reduce the potential for farm income generation in Africa, and their removal is 
essential to an effective trade liberalization of groundnut product markets.  
Many developing countries have been reluctant participants in the Doha Round. 
They stand to lose their preferential-trade-partner status, as multilateral tariff reductions 
and greater market access erode their preferences. However, in some markets such as 
groundnuts and cotton, many African countries have a comparative advantage that would 
enable them to compete in world markets and generate rural income and exports earnings, 
and alleviate rural poverty (see Baffes 2003 for cotton). If not wasted after the Cancun 
debacle, such opportunities provide these countries with a stake in the Doha Round. India 
and China have other opportunities to reap from the Doha process, especially in services 
and manufacturing trade in the context of their diversified economies. Resuming the 
Doha Round and bringing it to a successful conclusion will hinge on, among other things, 
identifying opportunities and trade-offs palatable to all parties—thus overcoming 
entrenched vested interests in protected markets.  
Despite their importance for small developing countries, groundnut product markets 
have been systematically neglected in policy analysis related to the Doha Round using 
computable general equilibrium models (Beghin, Roland-Host, and van der Menbrugghe 
2003; Anderson et al. 2000), mostly because of the constraints of data in the GTAP 
commodity coverage. Previous partial-equilibrium investigations of groundnut policy do 
not model world price formation; they have focused instead on unilateral reforms that 
assume either parametric border prices or simple world price reduced forms (e.g., 
Chvosta et al. 2003; Hathie and Lopez 2002; Rucker and Thurman 1990).  
Our paper fills this void. We use a new partial-equilibrium, multi-market interna-
tional model to analyze trade and agricultural policies affecting groundnut products 
markets. The model covers four goods (food-quality groundnuts, crush-quality 
groundnuts, groundnut oil, and groundnut cake) in 13 countries/regions (Argentina, 
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Canada, China, the EU-15, the Gambia, India, Malawi, Mexico, Nigeria, Senegal, South 
Africa, the United States, and the Rest of the World). Welfare is evaluated by looking at 
consumers’ equivalent variation, quasi-profits in farming (groundnut farming, livestock), 
quasi-profits in crushing, and taxpayers’ revenues and outlays implied by distortions. We 
calibrate the model on the recent historical data (1999-2001) and current (2003) policies. 
Through our analysis of several groundnut trade liberalization scenarios, in deviation 
from this recent historical baseline, we are able to shed new light on important issues.  
First, we show that world trade liberalization, including the removal of trade 
distortions by India and China, would increase groundnut product prices by 10 to 27 
percent above their current levels. As a result, net buyers of these products in OECD 
(Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development) countries would be worse 
off. Further, we find that the poorest countries present in these world markets would 
mostly gain from full trade liberalization because they are net sellers of the cash crop and 
products. Farm income generation in Africa in particular would be substantial relative to 
the size of these economies, increasing by about $100 million of farm profit in 2001. In 
India, consumers would be better off, with lower consumer prices resulting from the 
removal of prohibitive tariffs more than offsetting the higher world prices of groundnut 
oil. Large imports of groundnut products would take place. The cost of adjustment would 
fall on Indian farmers and crushers.  
In China, crush margins would improve because of the large terms-of-trade effects in 
the oil market relative to the seed market. China’s production and exports of groundnut 
products would expand dramatically. Hence, China could benefit from multilateral trade 
liberalization based on mercantilist grounds. Finally, we find that aggregate trade would 
expand dramatically, and the thinness of groundnut product markets could be much 
reduced under free trade. We conclude the paper by drawing implications for the Doha 
negotiations with a South-South perspective. 
 
Background Information and Policies 
Groundnuts are one of the world’s main oilseed crops. They are widely cultivated in 
developed and developing countries. World groundnut production grew at around 2.3 
percent annually over the last 20 years, driven by a tremendous growth in China. Global 
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export of edible groundnuts increased annually by 2.2 percent, which is in sharp contrast 
to exports of groundnut oil and meal, which declined by 1.0 and 2.5 percent per year, 
respectively, over the last 20 years despite growing global consumption of these two 
products. International trade in groundnuts remained thin, with only 5 percent of world 
production sold in the international market. As we show later, this thinness has been 
exacerbated by trade distortions. 
Groundnuts provide livelihood and cash income to many poor farmers in the 
developing world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Asia. In Senegal, for 
instance, an estimated one million people (one-tenth of the population) are involved in 
groundnut production and processing. Groundnuts account for about 2 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) and 9 percent of exports in Senegal (Akobundu 1998). In 
Gambia, about three-quarters of the farmers grow groundnuts on about 53 percent of the 
arable land.  
China is the world’s largest exporter of groundnuts (with 32 percent of world edible 
groundnut exports), followed by the United States (19 percent) and Argentina (10.5 
percent). SSA (Senegal, Gambia, Nigeria, Malawi, South-Africa, and Sudan) has lost 
ground in world edible groundnut markets, collectively accounting for only 5 percent of 
the world market in 2001, down from 17 percent in 1976. In the groundnut oil market 
segment, however, Senegal is the world’s largest exporter, but this market has become all 
the thinner as other vegetable oils are increasingly used as substitutes for groundnut oil. 
Unlike many other agricultural products traded internationally, world prices of 
groundnuts have not declined during the 1990s but have fluctuated widely at around $850 
per metric ton for both edible groundnuts and groundnut oil. Diop, Beghin and Sewadeh 
(2003) provide further background information on these markets. Next, we review 
notable distortions in key producing regions. 
Policies in the United States 
The 2002 farm bill eliminated production quotas with a quota buyout and converted 
the former peanut price support program to a system of direct and countercyclical 
payments and a price floor cum production subsidy (non-recourse loans with marketing 
loan provisions). The key features of the new program are as follows. 
Groundnut Trade Liberalization: A South-South Debate? / 5 
1.  All groundnut producers now have equal access to a marketing loan program, 
under which producers can pledge their crops as collateral to obtain a marketing 
loan rate ($355/short ton). Producers may repay the loan at a rate that is the 
lesser of the repayment rate set by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
plus interest or the marketing loan rate plus interest, or they can forfeit the loan 
(Revoredo and Fletcher 2002). 
2.  Producers with a history of groundnut production during the 1998-2001 period 
receive a fixed “decoupled” payment and a countercyclical payment. Eligible 
production is the product of average yield in the base period and 85 percent of 
base-period acres. The countercyclical payment kicks in when market prices fall 
below an established target price of $495 net of the direct payment ($36/short 
ton). The payment rate is the difference between the target price net of the fixed 
payment and the higher of the 12-month national average market price for the 
marketing year for groundnuts or the marketing assistance loan rate.  
3.  Former owners of groundnut quotas receive compensation payments for the loss 
of quota asset value (see Revoredo and Fletcher 2002 for details). 
The elimination of production quotas decreased the price paid by U.S. food 
processors and thus increased domestic use of peanuts. It also took away the logic of 
importing confectionery peanuts to lower the cost of processing food items intensive in 
peanuts. The U.S. TRQ scheme is still in place but is redundant and the TRQs remain 
underfilled (Fletcher and Revoredo 2003). The lower cost of production of peanut 
butter/paste in the United States follows the same logic. The incentive to import cheaper 
peanut butter/paste from Argentina or Mexico has thus been seriously mitigated by the 
recent changes in the farm program. Production incentives created by the 2002 farm bill 
vary among different types of producers but the net effect is likely to be an increase in 
production. The fixed and countercyclical payments provide some incentives to increase 
production and can be viewed as supply-inducing subsidies (Adams et al. 2001); 
therefore, we treat them as fully coupled in our analysis to provide an upper bound on the 
impact of U.S. policy on world markets. 
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Policies in India and China  
Since the mid-1990s, India  and China have reduced direct government intervention 
in production, marketing, and international trade of groundnut products. In the last two 
years however, India has reversed its course and intensified trade barriers to protect its 
processors.  
By 1998, India had removed most restrictions on domestic trade, storage, and export 
of groundnuts and had allowed futures trading. This latter decision has permitted an 
important increase in futures contracts and even a recent use of online trading. However, 
while groundnut exports have been freed and imports are subject to fewer restrictions, 
tariff levels have remained high for all the three groundnut products considered here. 
Applied tariff rates actually increased in the last two years from 30 percent ad valorem 
rate in 2001 to 85 percent in 2003 (Diop, Beghin, and Sewadeh 2003). As Table 1 shows, 
tariffs on groundnuts and groundnut meal stand at 45 percent, while the tariff on 
groundnut oil now reaches 85 percent. Some aspects of the Indian legislation are costly 
for producers and users of groundnuts and create inefficiencies in the marketing system 
and in processing. For example, sales and purchases of groundnuts have to occur in the 
“Agricultural Produce Wholesale Markets,” a costly legislation for both farmers and 
processors who have to travel to the wholesale market, pay an agent commission, and pay 
other transaction fees.  
China has liberalized groundnut trade to some degree in recent years. Imports of 
groundnuts, which, until 1999, were the responsibility of only six state companies, are 
now opened to private firms. However, while the government has committed to cap and 
reduce trade-distorting domestic subsidies as part of its WTO admission agreements, 
guaranteed prices and government procurement schemes have remained in place.4 
Furthermore, groundnut border protection remains important in China, particularly for 
processed groundnuts (with a 30 percent ad valorem tariff). The tariff on raw groundnuts 
is 15 percent but is redundant since China is a natural low-cost exporter of edible peanuts. 
Tariffs on groundnut oil and meal are 10 and 5 percent respectively. The uneven 
application of the Chinese value-added tax (VAT) on imported and domestic products is 
another trade barrier (Diop, Beghin and Sewadeh 2003). The VAT is significant (13 to 17 
percent depending on the product). Industry sources claim that the  
 TABLE 1. Current trade and domestic policy parameters used in the model  
Country Commodity Description Unit Current Level 
Argentina Peanuts Export tax % of border price  4% 
Argentina Peanut meal Export rebate % 3% 
Argentina Peanut oil Export rebate % 2% 
EU-15 (European Union) Peanut oil Import Tariff % 6% 
EU-15 (European Union) Peanut oil Import subsidy for oil from Senegal  % 10% 
China Peanut raw Import tariff % 10% 
China Peanut processed Import tariff % 30% 
China Peanuts Value added tax % 17% 
China Peanut meal Tariff % 5% 
China Peanut oil Tariff % 10% 
China Peanut oil & meal Value added tax % 17% 
India Peanuts Tariff % 45% 
India Peanut meal Tariff % 45% 
India Peanut oil Tariff refined oil % 85% 
Rest of World  Peanuts Tariff % 5% 
Rest of World  Peanut meal Tariff % 0% 
Rest of World  Peanut oil Tariff % 0% 
Canada Peanuts Tariff % 0% 
Mexico Peanuts Tariff % 0% 
Senegal Peanuts Tariff % 5% 
Senegal Peanuts Tariff on processed % 20% 
Senegal Peanut meal Tariff % 0% 
Senegal Peanut oil Tariff refined oil % 20% 
Nigeria Peanuts Tariff % 0% 
Nigeria Peanut meal Tariff % 0% 
Nigeria Peanut oil Tariff refined oil % 0% 
Republic of South  Africa Peanuts Tariff % 0% 
Republic of South  Africa Peanuts Tariff processed peanut food % 6% 
Republic of South  Africa Peanut meal Tariff % 0% 
Republic of South  Africa Peanut oil Tariff refined oil % 20% 
Malawi Peanuts Tariff % 5% 
G
roundnut Trade Liberalization: A South-South D
ebate /7
  
 
TABLE 1. Continued     
Country Commodity Description Unit Current Level 
Malawi Peanuts Tariff processed for consumption % 25% 
Malawi Peanut meal Tariff % 0% 
Malawi Peanut oil Tariff refined oil % 20% 
Gambia Peanuts Tariff % 0% 
Gambia Peanut meal Tariff % 0% 
Gambia Peanut oil Tariff refined oil % 0% 
United States Peanuts Out-of-quota tariffs     
United States Peanuts    shelled out-of-quota tariffs % 132% 
United States Peanuts    in-shell out-of-quota tariffs % 164% 
United States Peanuts    duty-free imports from Mexico 1,000 mt 4.15 
United States Peanuts Mexico above-quota tariffs     
United States Peanuts     shelled peanuts (port price<652$/mt) $/mt 592 
United States Peanuts     shelled peanuts (port price>652$/mt) % 99% 
United States Peanuts     in-shell peanuts (port price<284$/mt) $/mt 391  
United States Peanuts     in-shell peanuts (port price>284$/mt) % 150% 
United States Peanuts 
GATT Schedule of U.S. Peanut Imports 
(shelled basis)     
United States Peanuts    Argentina 1,000 mt 43.9 
United States Peanuts    Mexico 1,000 mt 4.2 
United States Peanuts    Others 1,000 mt 9.0 
United States Peanuts    Total TRQ 1,000 mt 57.1 
United States Peanuts Domestic target price $/lb 0.2475 
United States Peanuts Domestic producer price at calibration $/lb 0.2340 
United States Peanuts Domestic fixed payment (fully coupled) $/lb 0.0180 
United States Peanuts 
Domestic loan rate scaled up 1.1 for 
annual average $/lb 0.1775 
United States Peanut meal Tariff % 0% 
United States Peanut oil Tariff % 0% 
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rules on domestic meal are not clear about who actually pays the VAT. Anecdotal 
evidence cited in USDA’s attaché reports (USDA various) indicates that the VAT is 
frequently not paid by domestic processors. The anecdotal nature of the protection 
provided by the VAT is problematic for quantifying protection. Our policy analysis 
considers several cases (with and without the VAT included in the trade barriers).  
Policies in Argentina 
Argentina’s groundnut trade policy contrasts sharply with those of India and China, 
as almost all of Argentina’s distortions are associated with exports. Until 2001, exports of 
raw groundnuts were taxed at 3.5 percent while exports of processed products were not 
taxed. However, as a result of Argentina’s recent financial crisis, export retention on 
groundnuts increased to 20 percent. This export tax may countervail the positive signal 
sent to groundnut exporters through the devaluation of the peso. Import tariffs on groundnuts 
and products in Argentina have escalated (5, 8, and 13 percent on groundnuts, cake, and oil), 
but these tariffs are redundant since the country is a net exporter of groundnut products. 
Policies in Key African Exporting Countries 
After decades of extensive intervention in the groundnut sector, African countries 
underwent, to a varying degree, market reforms in the 1980s under structural adjustment 
plans. One of the main objectives of market reforms was to eliminate direct and indirect 
taxation of farmers that had undermined production incentives in the 1970s and early 1980s 
and led to excess processing capacities in many groundnut producing countries (Badiane 
and Kinteh 1994). The reforms have, however, been piecemeal and partial. Governments 
have withdrawn from input markets. Credit and land market failures and high transaction 
costs have made credit access difficult for producers who want to purchase certified seeds 
and fertilizer. Governments have been reluctant to liberalize groundnut processing, for 
which privatization efforts started only recently (Senegal, Gambia). 
Traditionally, African governments have used pricing policies as levers to conven-
iently tax or subsidize farmers based on countries’ industrial policies and political 
circumstances. Taxation of groundnut farmers was high in the 1970s, but since the early 
1990s when world prices declined the situation has reversed in most African countries 
(Badiane and Kinteh 1994).5 In Senegal and Gambia, the main rationale for state 
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intervention in the groundnut sector has been to safeguard the viability of state-owned 
processing mills. Consequently, groundnut farmers’ share of the export price has been 
consistently lower than 60 percent in these two countries (Badiane and Gaye 1999). This 
policy has been counterproductive, since it has led farmers to bypass large public 
processing companies, leading to increased excess capacities and financial difficulties.  
Trade policies vary widely among African traditional groundnut exporters. Senegal 
and Malawi apply tariffs to processed groundnuts and oil to encourage in-country 
processing of groundnuts (oil production in the case of Senegal). In contrast, Gambia and 
Nigeria have a liberal trade policy with no border intervention. South Africa’s tariff 
structure exhibits a slight escalation; processed groundnuts are subject to a tariff of 6 
percent while unprocessed groundnuts enter duty free. State trading occurs in several 
countries, allowing enforcement of duties on oil imports (e.g., Senegal). Table 1 shows 
the various tariff rates applied by African countries on processed products. 
Trade Barriers in Major High-Income Groundnut Importing Countries 
Tariff barriers for groundnuts are not an obstacle in major high-income importing 
countries: the two largest groundnut importers in this category, the European Union and 
Canada, have a zero tariff for unprocessed groundnuts and low-processed groundnuts for 
the Generalized System of Preferences and for least-developed countries. Assessment of 
market access in these countries should also take into account the strict quality standards 
and SPS (sanitary and phytosanitary) regulations (Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 2001). In 
contrast to the European Union and Canada, Japan and especially Korea have a higher 
tariff regime for groundnuts.  
 
The Groundnut Product Model 
We refer the interested reader to Beghin and Matthey 2003, which provides a 
detailed technical description of the model and its calibration. 
Groundnut Markets  
Groundnut supply. For exposition sake, we abstract from a country subscript when 
presenting the structure of the model. We make it clear whenever aggregation over 
countries is necessary. In each producing country, the aggregate groundnut supply, GS, is a 
Groundnut Trade Liberalization: A South-South Debate? / 11 
 
function of the current domestic price, Pgavrg, the average of the domestic farmgate prices 
for food-groundnut production, FGS, and crush-groundnut production, CGS, or Pgavrg = 
(CGS/GS)Pcg+(1-(CGS/GS))Pfg. A linear specification is chosen for the supply:  
 GS = bgo+bg1 Pgavw = bgo+bg1[ (CGS/GS)Pcg+(FGS/GS)Pfg]. (1) 
Shares (CGS/GS) and (1-(CGS/GS)) are endogenous and reflect the composition of 
aggregate output. Estimates of parameters bg come from the econometric or consensus 
estimates of supply elasticities depending on availability. This convoluted approach to 
modeling the aggregate supply decision is motivated by the lack of data on individual 
land allocation and yield for the two types of groundnuts in many countries. This 
approach mimics two separate production decisions for which individual data are not 
available and that are “revealed” at harvest time. It is clear that if the price of food-
quality groundnuts rises relative to the price of crush-quality groundnuts, then farmers 
will exert more effort to increase the average quality of their crop, resulting in a larger 
share of food-quality groundnuts in their aggregate groundnut crop.  
The farmgate price of food-groundnuts, Pfg, is a function of the world price of food 
groundnuts expressed in local currency, Pgw, inclusive of distortions affecting the 
producer at the farmgate level, τg, and the transaction cost affecting the farmgate price 
from the border, tcg. In sum, we have Pfg = ψ (Pgw+ τg )+ tcg. Parameter ψ represents a 
price transmission/pass-through scalar. If ψ = 1, then full transmission is assumed. We 
use values between 0.4 and 1.0 for this parameter in the simulations. The imperfect pass-
through of world prices to domestic markets is also consistent with a quality differential 
across countries, since the world price (the so-called Rotterdam Price) corresponds to the 
best available quality worldwide. 
The crush-quality groundnut price, Pcg, is determined by the domestic equilibrium 
for crush-quality groundnuts, since the latter are treated as a nontraded good market. 
Domestic supply satisfies the crush-quality groundnut demand, which is explained 
below. Relative to crush-quality, food-quality groundnuts receive a quality premium. 
This price premium is endogenous and driven by cost to reflect the relative marginal 
cost of food-quality groundnuts. World price Pgw is determined by the equilibrium of 
the world market for food-groundnuts.  
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The change in welfare of groundnut producers is measured by the change in the 
realized quasi-profit, from the initial situation reflecting the current distorted prices to a 
set of new prices. This welfare measure is 
 Πp = ∫Pgavr 0
Pgavrg
1
 
GS(Pgavrg ) dPgavrg,  (2) 
where superscripts 0 and 1 indicate old and new situations.  
 
Total crush-quality groundnut demand. The total demand for crush-quality 
groundnuts, TGCD, is a sum of demands coming from seed use, GSEED, and crushing 
industry, GCD: 
 TGCD = GSEED+ GCD. (3) 
The seed demand is assumed to be driven by the price of groundnuts and the expected 
production requirement for the year, which for simplicity is assumed to be equal to the actual 
output for the year. Hence, we assume instantaneous adjustment of seed demand to 
concurrent production changes. We also assume that the seed demand reflects an agronomic 
constraint, and we do not consider substitution with other inputs in groundnut production: 
 GSEED = αs0 + αs1GS+ αs2Pcg,  (4) 
with αs0 denoting the intercept, αs1 denoting the seed requirement per unit of output, and 
αs1 denoting the price response of seed demand.  
The crush demand is driven by groundnut oil demand and/or by cake demand. Given 
the joint product of oil and cake and the positive economic value attached to cake, the 
derived demand from crushing reflects both groundnut oil and its cake by-product. The 
derived demand for crush groundnuts is driven by the crush margin, bcrush:  
 GCD = GCD( bcrush ) with bcrush = γoilPo + γcake Pcake-Pcg. (5) 
Parameters γoil and γcake reflect the jointness of cake and oil in crushing (the oil and cake 
produced per unit of crush-groundnuts). 
Food-quality groundnut demand. Food-quality groundnut demand, GFD, represents a 
single aggregate food use representing several food items in groundnut-equivalent (e.g., 
prepared groundnuts, groundnut butter, and candies). The final demand for food-
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groundnuts is the first component of an incomplete final-demand system for food-
groundnuts and groundnut oil, and an aggregate for other goods. The system explains 
final consumption decisions for the two groundnut goods as determined by corresponding 
prices described in a vector Ppg, Ppg = (Pgg, Po), and income, M. The demand is  
 GFD = GFD(Pgg, Po, Pz, M).  (6) 
The price of an aggregate representing all other goods is given as Pz. The parameteriza-
tion of GFD is explained in the section dedicated to the final consumer. The consumer 
price, Pgg, is the world price of food-groundnuts inclusive of distortions, dgg, affecting 
consumers and a price wedge dictated by transaction cost, tcg. A net importer status 
would imply an additional transportation margin, atg, and Pgg = Pgw+dgg + tcg + atg in the 
latter case. 
Equilibrium in groundnut domestic markets. The crush-groundnut domestic market 
equilibrium is reached when the supply and demand for crush-groundnuts are set equal, 
or TGCD = CGS.  
For food-groundnuts, the domestic equilibrium is reached with trade: 
 GFD-FGS = FGnetrade. (7) 
Net trade, FGnetrade, could be either imports or exports. 
World market equilibrium for food-groundnuts. The sum of excess demands over all 
countries is equal to zero and determines the world price for food-quality groundnuts.  
The Crushing Industry  
Oil and meal production. We make the usual assumptions of fixed proportion in the 
jointness of cake and oil production and about price-taking in oilseed crushing. As the 
crush margin increases, the demand for crush-groundnuts increases, and the joint supply 
of oil and meal rises, increasing the scarcity for crush-quality peanuts and decreasing the 
scarcity of oil and meal, until equilibrium is reached. 
The oil supply, GOS, and the cake supply, CakeS, are GOS = γoilGCD, and CakeS = 
γcake GCD. The welfare of the crusher is just the quasi-profit from crushing. The change 
in welfare between the two policy regimes is the difference in profits between the two 
states of the world: 
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 ∆Πcrush = GCD1( b1crush ) – GCD0( b0crush ),  (8) 
where margin bicrush is evaluated at prices prevailing in period i. 
Groundnut oil demand. Groundnut oil demand is the final consumer demand. 
Groundnut oil is the second component of the incomplete demand system, as previously 
explained. Demand for oil is structured similarly to that for prepared groundnuts: 
 GOD = GOD(Pgg, Po, Pz, M).  (9) 
The calibration of GOD is explained in the next section. 
Cake demand. Cake demand is a derived demand from livestock production. It is an 
output-constant demand, which is a function of livestock numbers (aggregate livestock 
animal units), LAU, and the price of cakes and of other feed products, Pfeed. We assume 
that the animal unit numbers and prices of competing feed products are unaffected by the 
policy reform and abstract away from them in the policy scenario. The cake demand is 
 CakeD = CakeD( Pcake, Pfeed, LAU). (10) 
Oil and cake domestic market equilibrium. We assume trade in groundnut oil and 
cake is an excess demand/supply and that it provides closure in these markets: 
 GOD-GOS = GOnetrade, and (11) 
 CakeD-CakeS = Cakenetrade, (12) 
with GOnetrade and Cakenetrade representing the country import from or export to the 
world market for the two products. The link between the world price in domestic 
currency and the domestic price for these two products is made via a price transmission 
equation similar to the one for food-groundnut price with scalars ψcake and ψoil. The 
equations are 
 Pcake = ψcake (Pcakew+ τcake ) +tccake,  (13) 
and 
 Po = ψoil (Pow + τo) + tco ,  (14) 
with parameters tc and τ representing the price wedge for transaction cost and distortions. 
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Oil and cake world market equilibrium. The sum of excess demand over all countries 
is equal to zero and determines the world prices for oil and cake, which are traded 
commodities in the model and for which systematic trade data exist. 
Treatment and Calibration of Final Consumption  
We follow the demand calibration procedure of Beghin, Bureau, and Drogué (2003). 
We have a representative consumer with expenditure function e(P, U) with P being the 
vector of relevant consumer prices, and with U denoting utility. We are interested in a 
vector of two groundnut-containing goods GGD = (GFD, GOD), that is, prepared 
groundnuts and groundnut oil, with prices Ppg = (Pgg, Po). We have the aggregate other 
goods, Z, for completeness with price Pz. The approach allows us to derive an exact 
welfare measure from an incomplete demand system. The price vector P is to be 
decomposed into P = (Pgg, Po, Pz), and income is denoted by M, with subscripts indicating 
the respective commodities. Marshallian demands for agricultural and food goods are 
quadratic in prices and linear in income:  
 GGDM = ε + V Ppg + χ (M- ε’Ppg- 1/2Ppg’V Ppg - δ(pz)). (15) 
 
The latter demands correspond to the expenditure function 
 e(Ppg, pz, θ) = Ppg’ε + 12 Ppg’V Ppg + δ(pz)+ θ(Pz, u)e
χ’Ppg. (16) 
The elements of vectors ε and χ in equations (15) and (16), together with the elements of 
matrix V, are calibrated as in Beghin, Bureau, and Drogué 2003.  
Welfare Analysis 
Consumer. Equations (15 ) and (16 ) lead to an equivalent variation, EV, equal to  
EV = [M– ε’P1pg – 0.5 P1pg’V P1pg] exp[(χ’P0pg – χ’P1pg ] – [M – ε’P0pg – 0.5 P0pg’V P0pg ]. (17) 
We compute the change in expenditure, which would keep utility at the free trade utility 
level under the distorted program prices. Superscripts 0 and 1 denote initial distorted and 
final free-trade prices.  
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Taxpayers. With policy reforms, there is a potential change in tax revenues for food-
groundnuts, groundnut oil, and groundnut cake trade. These losses are captured by the 
accounting identity (new flow*new tax rate*new price - old flow*old tax rate*old price) 
in each market.  
Net welfare gains from policy reform. Net welfare is defined as the EV of the 
consumer net of losses/gains to groundnut producers, changes in livestock producers’ 
surplus, changes in profits in crushing, and gains (losses) for taxpayers. 
 
Calibration and Policy Scenarios 
Calibration 
We calibrate the model for three years (1999/2000, 2000/01, and 2001/02) on 
historical data using Microsoft Excel. Then we measure the impact of policy scenarios in 
deviation from the historical baseline expressed in 1995 constant U.S. dollars for the 
three years. We use data from the USDA-Foreign Agricultural Service’s Production, 
Supply, and Demand (PS&D) data to calibrate production, utilization, and trade of 
groundnuts and products. The latter dataset is completed by Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO 1999) data when USDA-FAS PS&D is not available. The macro data 
(GDP, GDP deflator, exchange rate) come from the International Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics (various) and the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database (various).  
In most countries, the typical groundnut quality premium is such that Pcg is between 
40 and 50 percent of Pfg. As more food groundnuts are produced relative to crush 
groundnuts, the premium for food groundnuts increases to reflect the higher relative 
marginal cost of food-quality groundnuts. We calibrate the two prices as follows: Pcg = 
Pfg (0.42+0.05 CGS/GS)), which reflects the stylized facts of the two prices’ relationship. 
The analysis reflects the current (2003) level of trade and domestic policies 
presented in the policy section of the paper. The policy coverage allows for the analysis 
of the separate impact of border measures on groundnuts, oil, and cake in all countries, 
their combined effects, and U.S. domestic peanut policy. Table 1 presents the 
parameterized policy instruments by country. The coverage of border measures is 
extensive. The coverage of domestic distortions (farm support, other taxes/subsidies) is 
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spottier. Domestic distortions are documented for OECD countries but are harder to 
collect for developing economies, especially when parastatals are involved in marketing 
and trade. We cover the major features of the 2002 U.S. farm bill for peanuts (loan rate, 
countercyclical payments based on the target price, and fixed payments which are 
assumed fully coupled). Value-added taxes are available for China and are incorporated 
into the model.  
The various supply and demand elasticities used in the model are detailed in Beghin 
and Matthey 2003. Most of the elasticities come from the elasticity database of the Food 
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) and are a combination of econometric 
and consensus estimates. Both demand and supply are price-inelastic. Income elasticities 
are positive but smaller than one. 
Policy Reform Scenarios  
We analyze multiple scenarios. First, we consider full multilateral trade liberalization 
for groundnuts, cake, and oil, with (FMTL&US) and without (FMTL) the removal of the 
U.S. peanut program. Then we consider multilateral groundnut trade liberalization, again 
with and without the removal of the U.S. farm peanut program (GMTL&US, and GMTL 
scenarios); next, we consider full trade liberalization in the two largest and most distorted 
groundnut markets, China and India (CIFTL scenario). We report results on these five 
key scenarios in Tables 2 through 7. We report the impact in levels, and then in 
proportional changes (the three-year average of proportional impacts) in the last column 
of Tables 2 through 6. Table 7 reports changes in welfare in 1995 purchase power parity 
in U.S. dollars (purchase power parity holding in 1995).  
 
Results 
The impact of moving to free trade can be described as follows. In countries with 
high groundnut protection, the combined effect of the world price increase and removal 
of their own protection is beneficial to final users of groundnuts, other things being equal. 
For countries with moderate or no groundnut protection prior to reform, the net impact 
(tariff removal and terms of trade) is an increase in domestic groundnut prices, 
handicapping groundnut users (final consumers, crushers) but benefiting producers, other 
things being equal. 
 
TABLE 2. Full trade liberalization and removal of U.S. farm policy (FMTL&US scenario) 
 New Levels After Reform Baseline Levels Average Change for  
 99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 Three Years 
Peanuts Trade (1,000mt)         
Net exporters         
Argentina 241 190 196 226 177 185 7% 
China 699 659 687 540 450 525 36% 
Gambia 9 12 17 8 11 15 11% 
India 89 -1 33 100 100 125 -62% 
Malawi 0 1 1 2 3 3 -80% 
Nigeria 30 39 42 0 0 0 3,667% 
Senegal -5 -10 -3 2 4 5 -287% 
South Africa 26 20 38 20 16 35 22% 
United States 272 162 234 255 141 231 8% 
Total net exports 1,361 1,072 1,245 1,153 902 1,124 16% 
Net importers         
Canada 111 102 105 116 107 110 -5% 
European Union 441 428 448 457 441 463 -3% 
Mexico 94 65 69 101 72 75 -8% 
Rest of the World 525 467 563 290 272 415 63% 
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0% 
Total net imports 1,361 1,072 1,245 1,153 902 1,124 16% 
Peanut price U.S. run. 40/50 CIF Rotterdam $/mt 896 972 779 820 888 700 10% 
Peanut meal trade (1,000 mt)         
Net exporters         
Argentina 73 54 63 67 50 52 13% 
China 111 119 124 9 15 25 741% 
Gambia 7 12 11 5 10 10 22% 
India -311 -297 -212 10 20 100 -1,702% 
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 9% 
Nigeria 26 26 34 0 0 0 2,867% 
Senegal 137 151 145 130 144 140 5% 
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Table 2. Continued    
 New Levels After Reform Baseline Levels Average Change for  
 99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 Three Years 
South Africa -4 2 1 -5 0 0 95% 
U.S. 33 29 31 6 5 5 484% 
Rest of the World 134 136 103 8 14 -12 499% 
Total net exports 206 233 300 230 258 320 -9% 
Net importers         
European Union 162 169 158 186 194 178 -12% 
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0% 
Total net imports 206 233 300 230 258 320 -9% 
Meal price 48/50% CIF Rotterdam $/mt 144 159 147 122 134 125 18% 
Peanut oil trade (1,000 mt)         
Net exporters         
Argentina 49 44 50 46 41 42 11% 
China 55 64 76 0 5 2 3469% 
Gambia 5 6 6 0 0 0 589% 
India -238 -225 -266 0 0 0 -24288% 
Malawi 0 0 1 0 0 0 43% 
Nigeria 72 72 77 35 35 30 123% 
Senegal 102 108 114 98 102 109 5% 
South Africa 0 1 1 0 0 0 49% 
U.S. 23 -18 6 2 -30 -10 288% 
Rest of the World 114 103 105 18 11 8 861% 
Total net exports 185 155 170 199 164 181 -6% 
Net importers         
European Union 136 101 109 150 110 120 -9% 
Residual 49 54 61 49 54 61 0% 
Total net imports 185 155 170 199 164 181 -6% 
Peanut oil price CIF Rotterdam $/mt 933 866 851 744 685 659 27% 
Welfare(million dollars) 690 920 763       791 
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TABLE 3. Full trade liberalization (FMTL scenario) 
 New Levels After Reform Baseline Levels Average Change for 
 99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 Three Years 
Peanut Trade (1,000 mt)         
Net exporters         
Argentina 241 190 195 226 177 185 6% 
China 693 655 678 540 450 525 34% 
Gambia 9 12 17 8 11 15 11% 
India 87 -1 29 100 100 125 -64% 
Malawi 0 1 1 2 3 3 -82% 
Nigeria 29 38 40 0 0 0 3,564% 
Senegal -6 -10 -4 2 4 5 -298% 
South Africa 26 20 38 20 16 35 22% 
United States 287 169 259 255 141 231 15% 
Total net exports 1,367 1,075 1,254 1,153 902 1,124 16% 
Net importers         
Canada 111 102 105 116 107 110 -5% 
European Union 442 428 448 457 441 463 -3% 
Mexico 94 65 69 101 72 75 -8% 
Rest of the World 531 470 571 290 272 415 65% 
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0% 
Total net imports 1,367 1,075 1,254 1,153 902 1,124 16% 
Peanut price U.S. Run. 40/50, CIF Rotterdam $/mt 895 972 778 820 888 700 10% 
Peanut meal trade (1,000 mt)         
Net exporters         
Argentina 73 54 63 67 50 52 13% 
China 111 119 123 9 15 25 739% 
Gambia 7 12 11 5 10 10 21% 
India -311 -297 -212 10 20 100 -1,703% 
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 8% 
Nigeria 26 26 34 0 0 0 2,862% 
Senegal 137 151 145 130 144 140 5% 
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TABLE 3. Continued 
 New Levels After Reform Baseline Levels Average Change for 
 99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 Three Years 
South Africa -4 2 1 -5 0 0 95% 
United States 33 29 32 6 5 5 487% 
Rest of the World 135 137 103 8 14 -12 499% 
Total net exports 206 233 300 230 258 320 -9% 
Net importers         
European Union 162 169 158 186 194 178 -12% 
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0% 
Total net imports 206 233 300 230 258 320 -9% 
Meal price 48/50% CIF Rotterdam $/mt 144 159 147 122 134 125 18% 
Peanut oil trade (1,000 mt)         
Net exporters         
Argentina 49 44 50 46 41 42 11% 
China 55 64 76 0 5 2 3,459% 
Gambia 5 6 6 0 0 0 587% 
India -238 -225 -266 0 0 0 -24,304% 
Malawi 0 0 1 0 0 0 43% 
Nigeria 72 72 77 35 35 30 123% 
Senegal 102 108 114 98 102 109 5% 
South Africa 0 1 1 0 0 0 49% 
United States 24 -17 6 2 -30 -10 290% 
Rest of the World 115 103 105 18 11 8 864% 
Total net exports 185 155 170 199 164 181 -6% 
Net importers         
European Union 136 101 109 150 110 120 -9% 
Residual 49 54 61 49 54 61 0% 
Total net imports 185 155 170 199 164 181 -6% 
Peanut oil price CIF Rotterdam $/mt 933 866 851 744 685 659 27% 
Welfare(million dollars) 691 924 757       791 
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TABLE 4. Peanut trade liberalization and removal of U.S. peanut program (GMTL&US scenario) 
 New Levels After Reform Baseline Levels Average Change for 
 99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 Three Years 
Peanut trade (1,000 mt)          
Net exporters          
Argentina 260 208 249 226 177 185 22% 
China 748 703 688 540 450 525 42% 
Gambia 11 15 18 8 11 15 31% 
India -482 -553 -415 100 100 125 -556% 
Malawi -1 1 1 2 3 3 -93% 
Nigeria 68 75 82 0 0 0 7,470% 
Senegal 4 2 2 2 4 5 -8% 
South Africa 25 20 38 20 16 35 20% 
United States 355 244 301 255 141 231 48% 
Total net exports 989 714 962 1,153 902 1,124 -17% 
Net importers          
Canada 112 102 106 116 107 110 -4% 
European Union 440 426 449 457 441 463 -3% 
Mexico 95 66 70 101 72 75 -7% 
Rest of the World 153 109 275 290 272 415 -47% 
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0% 
Total net imports 989 714 962 1,153 902 1,124 -17% 
Peanuts price U.S. Run 40/50, CIF Rotterdam $/mt 884 960 759 820 888 700 8% 
Peanut meal trade (1,000 mt)          
Net exporters          
Argentina 64 47 47 67 50 52 -6% 
China -11 -9 12 9 15 25 -144% 
Gambia 5 10 10 5 10 10 -2% 
India 71 95 151 10 20 100 344% 
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 1% 
Nigeria -2 -2 -2 0 0 0 -193% 
Senegal 129 143 140 130 144 140 -1% 
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TABLE 4. Continued 
 New Levels After Reform Baseline Levels Average Change for 
 99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 Three Years 
South Africa -5 0 0 -5 0 0 -7% 
United States -14 -18 -13 6 5 5 -380% 
Rest of the World -7 -5 -25 8 14 -12 -70% 
Total net exports 231 260 320 230 258 320 0% 
Net importers          
European Union 187 196 178 186 194 178 1% 
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0% 
Total net imports 231 260 320 230 258 320 0% 
Peanut meal price 48/50% CIF Rotterdam 122 133 125 122 134 125 0% 
Peanut oil trade (1,000 mt)          
Net exporters          
Argentina 44 39 38 46 41 42 -6% 
China -13 -11 -7 0 5 2 -705% 
Gambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 -5% 
India 45 55 38 0 0 0 4,591% 
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Nigeria 33 32 28 35 35 30 -6% 
Senegal 97 101 109 98 102 109 -1% 
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4% 
United States -14 -48 -24 2 -30 -10 -194% 
Rest of the World 7 -3 -2 18 11 8 -103% 
Total net exports 200 165 181 199 164 181 0% 
Net importers          
European Union 151 111 120 150 110 120 0% 
Residual 49 54 61 49 54 61 0% 
Total net imports 200 165 181 199 164 181 0% 
Peanut oil price CIF Rotterdam $/mt 747 686 664 744 685 659 0% 
Welfare (million dollars) 782 1024 799       868 
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TABLE 5. Impact of peanut trade liberalization (GMTL scenario) 
 New Levels After Reform Baseline Levels Average Change for 
 99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 Three Years 
Peanut trade        
Net exporters        
Argentina 260 208 248 226 177 185 22% 
China 742 699 678 540 450 525 41% 
Gambia 11 15 18 8 11 15 30% 
India -483 -554 -419 100 100 125 -557% 
Malawi -0.6 0.7 0.6 2 3 3 -95% 
Nigeria 67 74 80 0 0 0 7,358% 
Senegal 3 2 2 2 4 5 -20% 
South Africa 25 20 37 20 16 35 20% 
United States 371 253 327 255 141 231 55% 
Total net exports 995 717 972 1,153 902 1,124 -16% 
Net importers        
Canada 112 102 106 116 107 110 -4% 
European Union 440 426 449 457 441 463 -3% 
Mexico 95 66 70 101 72 75 -7% 
Rest of the World 159 112 285 290 272 415 -45% 
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0% 
Total net imports 995 717 972 1,153 902 1,124 -16% 
Peanut price: U.S. runners 40/50, CIF Rotterdam 883 959 758 820 888 700 8% 
Peanut meal trade        
Net exporters        
Argentina 64.42 46.98 47.23 67.00 50.00 52.00 -6% 
China -10.71 -9.49 11.42 9.00 15.00 25.00 -146% 
Gambia 4.87 9.81 9.92 5.00 10.00 10.00 -2% 
India 70.15 94.53 150.54 10.00 20.00 100.00 342% 
Malawi 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 1% 
Nigeria -1.89 -2.37 -1.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 -196% 
Senegal 129.18 142.68 139.58 130.00 144.00 140.00 -1% 
South Africa -5.09 -0.19 -0.05 -5.00 0.00 0.00 -7% 
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TABLE 5. Continued 
 New Levels After Reform Baseline Levels Average Change for 
 99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 Three Years 
United States -13.70 -17.66 -12.35 6.00 5.00 5.00 -376% 
Rest of the World -6.06 -4.64 -24.20 8.00 14.00 -12.00 -69% 
Total net exports 231.18 259.63 320.50 230.00 258.00 320.00 0.4% 
Net importers        
European Union 187 196 179 186 194 178 1% 
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0% 
Total net imports 231 260 321 230 258 320 0% 
Peanut meal price: 48/50% CIF Rotterdam 122 133 125 122 134 125 0% 
Peanut oil trade        
Net exporters        
Argentina 44 39 38 46 41 42 -6% 
China -13 -12 -7 0 5 2 -713% 
Gambia -0.07 -0.16 0.04 0 0 0 -6% 
India 44 55 38 0 0 0 4,558% 
Malawi -0.006 -0.027 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0% 
Nigeria 33 32 28 35 35 30 -6% 
Senegal 97 101 109 98 102 109 -1% 
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4% 
United States -13 -48 -23 2 -30 -10 -192% 
Rest of the World 8 -3 -1 18 11 8 -99% 
Total net exports 200 165 181 199 164 181 0% 
Net importers        
European Union 151 111 120 150 110 120 0% 
Residual 49 54 61 49 54 61 0% 
Total net imports 200 165 181 199 164 181 0% 
Peanut oil price: CIF Rotterdam 746 686 664 744 685 659 0% 
Welfare (million dollars) 783 1,028 795    869 
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TABLE 6. Impact of China and India with full liberalization (CIFTL scenario) 
 New Levels After Reform Baseline Levels Average Change for 
 99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 Three Years 
Peanut trade        
Net exporters        
Argentina 223 174 160 226 177 185 -6% 
China 586 531 589 540 450 525 13% 
Gambia 8 11 16 8 11 15 3% 
India 55 -38 0 100 100 125 -94% 
Malawi 4 5 5 2 3 3 84% 
Nigeria 12 19 22 0 0 0 1,776% 
Senegal -24 -19 -9 2 4 5 -708% 
South Africa 24 19 37 20 16 35 14% 
United States 258 142 238 255 141 231 2% 
Total net exports 1,147 845 1,058 1,153 902 1,124 -4% 
Net importers        
Canada 112 103 106 116 107 110 -4% 
European Union 448 433 453 457 441 463 -2% 
Mexico 96 67 70 101 72 75 -6% 
Rest of the World 302 232 369 290 272 415 -7% 
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0% 
Total net imports 1,147 845 1,058 1,153 902 1,124 -4% 
Peanut price U.S. Run. 40/50, CIF Rotterdam $/mt 877 952 763 820 888 700 8% 
Peanut meal trade        
Net exporters        
Argentina 76 57 67 67 50 52 18% 
China 114 122 126 9 15 25 759% 
Gambia 7 12 11 5 10 10 22% 
India -309 -294 -210 10 20 100 -1,690% 
Malawi 1 0 0 0 0 0 46% 
Nigeria 26 26 34 0 0 0 2,867% 
Senegal 150 165 155 130 144 140 14% 
South Africa -3 3 2 -5 0 0 139% 
United States 37 33 35 6 5 5 563% 
Rest of the World  108 108 80 8 14 -12 385% 
Total net exports 205 233 300 230 258 320 -9% 
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TABLE 6. Continued 
 New Levels After Reform Baseline Levels Average Change for 
 99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 Three Years 
United States 37 33 35 6 5 5 563% 
Rest of the World 108 108 80 8 14 -12 385% 
Total net exports 205 233 300 230 258 320 -9% 
Net importers        
European Union 161 169 158 186 194 178 -13% 
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0% 
Total net imports 205 233 300 230 258 320 -9% 
Meal price 48/50% CIF Rotterdam $/mt 144 159 147 122 134 125 18% 
Peanut oil trade        
Net exporters        
Argentina 51 45 53 46 41 42 16% 
China 53 61 74 0 5 2 3,354% 
Gambia 5 6 6 0 0 0 567% 
India -240 -226 -269 0 0 0 -24,481% 
Malawi 2 2 2 0 0 0 185% 
Nigeria 71 71 76 35 35 30 120% 
Senegal 116 126 126 98 102 109 19% 
South Africa 2 2 2 0 0 0 224% 
United States 26 -14 9 2 -30 -10 326% 
Rest of the World 92 79 85 18 11 8 665% 
Total net exports 180 151 166 199 164 181 -8% 
        
Net importers        
European Union 131 97 105 150 110 120 -12% 
Residual 49 54 61 49 54 61 0% 
Total net imports 180 151 166 199 164 181 -8% 
Peanut oil price CIF Rotterdam $/mt 924 857 844 744 685 659 26% 
Welfare effects (million $) 765 1,013 815 - - - 864 
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TABLE 7. Welfare effects of policy scenarios in million dollars at 1995 prices 
(average 1999-2001) 
Country FMTL&US FMTL GMTL&US GMTL CIFTL 
Argentina 16.07 15.94 9.97 9.84 12.66 
EU-15 -51.83 -51.27 -34.40 -33.82 -58.87 
China 666.25 668.76 650.65 653.33 716.25 
India 213.27 214.11 196.57 197.79 228.59 
Rest of the World -126.69 -127.06 -4.21 -4.86 -71.06 
Canada -5.94 -5.87 -4.88 -4.81 -4.59 
Mexico -7.43 -7.34 -6.11 -6.01 -5.73 
Senegal 41.03 40.96 21.93 21.86 21.39 
Nigeria 15.93 15.77 7.22 7.07 13.45 
South Africa 2.30 2.28 2.19 2.17 0.53 
Malawi 7.45 7.45 7.60 7.61 -1.06 
Gambia 0.43 0.42 0.24 0.24 0.36 
United States 20.18 16.70 21.71 18.40 12.39 
Africa-5 totala 67.14 66.89 39.18 38.95 34.67 
Total 791.01 790.87 868.48 868.79 864.32 
a Denotes the aggregate of Senegal, Nigeria, South Africa, Malawi, and the Gambia. 
 
In countries with high protection of the oil and/or meal sectors (e.g., India), the oil 
and cake tariff removal, net of the world price hike, induces lower domestic prices for 
these two products and reduces crush margins. As a result of the lower crush margins, the 
domestic excess demand for oil and cake increases (reduced crush, larger local demand 
for oil and cake). In contrast, countries with moderate protection in their oil and cake 
markets face a net price increase for oil and cake after trade liberalization. Their final 
consumption of these value-added products decreases, and crushing increases as their 
crush margins improve with the reform, other things being equal. Their excess supply of 
these products increases, that is, they exhibit larger exports.  
The two full trade liberalization scenarios with and without the removal of U.S. farm 
policy, FMTL&US and FMTL, have nearly identical effects. They bring strong price 
increases for all three products, 10 percent for groundnuts, 18 percent for groundnut cake, 
and 27 percent for groundnut oil, as shown in Tables 2 and 3. The welfare impact of the 
FMTL&US and FMTL reforms is influenced by the change in the groundnut oil price, 
which affects the crush margin. Specifically, crush margins deteriorate in the European 
Union and India. However, margins improve in China, Gambia, Nigeria, Senegal, South 
Africa, and the United States.  
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As shown in Tables 2 and 3, trade patterns change dramatically. China expands its 
exports of the three products. The high increase in the price of oil improves the crush 
margin and stimulates crush and excess supply in China. A higher price for oil in the 
domestic markets translates into more production and reduced oil consumption. By 
contrast, in India the lower crush margin reduces oil and meal production; lower consumer 
prices for all groundnut products stimulate oil and feed demands and eventually their 
imports because of reduced domestic supplies. African producers expand their exports of 
value-added products. Senegal and Malawi decrease their exports of groundnuts because of 
larger domestic use. Accounting for the trade reversals in Tables 2 and 3, aggregate trade in 
groundnuts increases by 16 percent, and trade in value-added products more than doubles. 
Trade distortions undoubtedly exacerbate the thinness of these markets. 
The first two columns of Table 7 show the welfare impact of these two reforms. The 
aggregate net welfare effects of FMTL&US (and FMTL) amount to about $791 million at 
1995 prices. Not surprisingly, China and India experience the largest welfare gains since 
they have the two largest and most distorted groundnut product markets. China’s welfare 
gains are about $666 million, whereas India’s’ gains are about $213 million. The 
“moderate” world welfare effect first comes from offsets (some countries gain in 
aggregate whereas others, chiefly the EU-15, lose). Further, for many countries, besides 
China and India, individual net gains/losses are moderate, because of the small size of the 
three markets and their price-inelastic nature. The latter brings large transfers but small 
deadweight losses. Indeed, substantial transfers occur between consumers, crushers, and 
producers. These transfers offset each other.  
World price effects induced by the reforms have a similar transfer impact (offsetting 
rectangles and small triangles), including in countries with undistorted markets. For 
example, in Nigeria following FMTL, groundnut producers gain $34 million of quasi-rents; 
consumers experience welfare losses of $65 million because of higher oil and processed 
groundnut prices; crushers gain $51 million; and meal users (feed users) lose about $3 
million. The country in aggregate is better off by a mere $16 million. Rural net income 
(producer surplus) generated by groundnut production increases by about $100 million in 
2001 for the five African countries included in our analysis, suggesting potential for 
poverty alleviation in these countries by stimulating small-holders’ production. 
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Under multilateral trade liberalization for all three products, the removal of the U.S. 
program does not matter in terms of its impact on trade flows, terms of trade, or welfare. 
This result hinges on the fact that the price floor established by the U.S. loan rate and the 
countercyclical payments are not effective because of the strong price effects of trade 
liberalization. The only remaining production-distorting element is the fixed payment 
(fully coupled in our model), which is small. Results under both scenarios (FMTL and 
FMTL&US) are qualitatively identical. The United States experiences moderate 
additional welfare gains of $4 million for the removal of its domestic distortions (gains to 
U.S. taxpayers net of losses of U.S. producers). As noted earlier, world price effects are 
nearly identical. Similarly, trade flows are barely affected by the removal of the U.S. 
domestic program under free trade. U.S. peanut exports are about 15,000 metric tons (mt) 
lower in the FMTL&US scenario as compared to their level in the FMTL scenario. Given 
that our parameterization of U.S. farm policy assumes full coupling of payments received 
by producers to production, our assessment provides an upper bound on the effect of the 
current U.S. peanut program.6 
Many debates of the Doha Round of the WTO revolve around specific agricultural 
markets (for example, cotton). Hence, it is useful to assess what a narrow agricultural 
liberalization would achieve relative to a full trade liberalization encompassing value-
added products (oil and cake). The GMTL&US, and GMTL scenarios consider this type 
of reform, and their impacts are shown in Tables 4 and 5 and in the third and fourth 
columns of Table 7. Much is achieved by groundnut trade liberalization alone but with a 
large second-best component since distortions are present in the value-added markets. In 
these groundnut liberalization scenarios, the price of cake and oil is little affected, and 
crush margins are primarily affected by changes in groundnut prices.  
Margins improve in India but deteriorate in countries with limited groundnut 
distortions. Consumer welfare implications are also different in these groundnut trade 
scenarios. In highly protected oil markets, oil prices are higher under the groundnut trade 
scenarios (GMTL scenarios) than they would be under all-product trade liberalization 
(FMTL scenarios). In countries with no oil distortions, prices roughly remain at their 
baseline level and consumers do better under the groundnut trade liberalization than 
under FMTL scenarios. For the latter reason, the Rest of the World fares better under 
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GMTL scenarios than under FMTL scenarios. In contrast, African economies do much 
better with the FMTL scenarios than they would do with groundnut trade liberalization 
reforms. The potential Africa-5 welfare gains nearly double when moving from GMTL 
scenarios to FMTL ones.7 
If China and India liberalized alone (CIFTL scenario), the qualitative results of the 
FMTL scenarios would hold. What is striking in this last scenario is the importance of 
India’s and to a lesser extent China’s distortions and market size in the welfare, trade, and 
price effects. As suggested by Table 6 and the last column of Table 7, full trade 
liberalization really hinges on the removal of distortions in China and India. With the 
implementation of CIFTL, world price increases for the three products would be 
substantial: 8 percent for groundnuts, 18 percent for meal, and 26 percent for oil. The 
major welfare differences occur in the Rest of the World, where consumers are worse off 
than they would be under the GMTL, since oil prices are higher. Africa-5 improves its lot 
in aggregate but not as well as it would under the FMTL scenario, because Africa-5’s 
own distortions are still in place and because groundnut prices are not as high in the 
former scenario.  
We conducted sensitivity analysis to further investigate two key assumptions in the 
model: the prevailing groundnut market price underlying the U.S. market, and the level of 
protection of groundnut markets in China. We calibrated the model on 2002/3 U.S. prices 
($389/mt) to see if the new U.S. policy would have had a stronger impact on world 
markets under lower prevailing prices. U.S. farm prices in 2002/3 were 25 percent lower 
in 2002/3 than they were in 2001/2. We remove the loan rate, countercyclical payments, 
and fixed payments (assumed fully coupled in our model), while holding all other 
distortions in place in all other countries. The price floor provided by the loan rate is 
effective under the lower 2002/3 farm price. U.S. output decreases by 7 percent under the 
new prices and U.S. exports decrease by 52 percent, inducing an increase of 0.9 percent 
in the world price of groundnuts and negligible price impacts in the other markets. The 
aggregate net welfare effect is negligible and negative because the higher world price 
exacerbates distortions in other markets or increases import costs in net-importing 
countries. The United States gains about $22 million (program cost savings net of 
producer losses). We also ran the same change but with all other distortions removed in 
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all countries (FMTL&US scenario). In this scenario, the world price of groundnuts would 
have been 0.5 percent higher than the level under free trade cum U.S. farm bill. 
Removing the farm bill incentives in a free-trade world would decrease U.S. production 
by about 4 percent and would reduce U.S. exports by 31 percent. The aggregate welfare 
gains of FMTL vary by less than $1 million under these new assumptions. Hence, the 
conclusion that the current U.S. peanut policy is benign to world markets remains 
unaltered under lower U.S. market prices. 
The sensitivity analysis on China’s protection structure is more pivotal to the 
conclusions reached, especially the protection of the groundnut sector. We consider the 
following assumption changes: the protection of groundnut producers is assumed to be 15 
percent (the tariff is redundant in the original model). The Chinese farm sector is no 
longer assumed to be a net exporter without assistance. Under this new assumption and 
following full trade liberalization (FMTL&US), China becomes a net importer of 
groundnuts because demand for edible and crush groundnuts increases. China’s welfare 
gains are around $1.03 billion. Aggregate welfare gains are $1.16 billion. World prices 
increase by 18, 19, and 29 percent for groundnuts, cake, and oil respectively. We also 
lower the baseline protection of Chinese processed groundnuts to a 15 percent ad valorem 
tariff (the original tariff was 30 percent and the VAT was 17 percent). Under the latter 
assumptions, welfare gains from FMTL in China are only $266 million and aggregate 
gains are now $388 million. The world price of groundnuts increases by 9 percent in this 
modified scenario (1 percent less than in the original run). The major change in welfare 
occurs in China because Chinese consumers now gain much less from trade liberalization 
compared to the initial situation with original tariffs and a VAT on processed groundnuts.  
 
Policy Implications and Conclusions 
The groundnut market historically has been distorted by heavy government 
intervention in the United States, the only country in the North with a large stake in 
groundnut markets (Rucker and Thurman 1990). The 2002 U.S. farm bill has suppressed 
most unsustainable features of previous farm legislation, but new distortions it introduced 
have limited potential to depress world market prices and subsidize U.S. groundnut 
exports. The current U.S. peanut program is mostly a domestic issue, unlike U.S. 
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domestic policy for cotton, dairy, rice, and sugar. The distortion of groundnut product 
markets is essentially a South-South affair and debate. The remaining tariffs in the United 
States are high but redundant because the country is a net competitive exporter of high-
quality groundnuts. 
Developing country members would gain little by “forcing” further U.S. domestic 
policy reform unless groundnut prices fall to extremely low levels. Then the U.S. policy 
would further destabilize world prices given its anticyclical nature. U.S. producers 
actually would benefit from multilateral trade liberalization in groundnut product markets 
and are a natural ally of free traders in the South from a mercantilist perspective. 
India is the prominent protectionist force in groundnut markets. India has a long 
track record of agricultural distortions and closed borders. China made major concessions 
under the terms of accession to the WTO; it has a competitive groundnut farming sector 
but it continues to subsidize its crush-groundnuts in one way or another. The 
governments of India and China have succeeded in stimulating production and creation of 
domestic value-added products at the cost of major distortions both at home and in world 
markets. The prohibitive protection in India and distortions in China, exacerbated by their 
market sizes, depress world market prices. The two countries impose onto themselves 
large welfare losses. What is worse, they impose sizeable welfare and agricultural income 
losses onto smaller producing and exporting countries—mainly in Africa, hence our title. 
African countries also have engaged in value-added protection, but their small size has 
limited their detrimental impact on world markets. Distortions in the South are a principal 
reason for the thinness of world groundnut product markets. 
The removal of trade distortions by the two largest developing economies (India and 
China) is essential to successful reform of groundnut products markets. As we show, the 
poorest countries present in these markets would mostly gain from full trade 
liberalization because they are net sellers of these commodities. Although net world 
welfare effects of liberalizing these three markets are moderate, they are still significant 
for small agrarian economies such as Malawi, Senegal, and Gambia. Hence, in the 
context of poverty alleviation, liberalizing these markets would induce sizeable welfare 
gains and rural income generation in these countries. The simulations also show that 
beyond agricultural trade liberalization, the liberalization of the value-added markets is 
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essential to achieving larger welfare gains in African countries. Although large world 
welfare gains occur with groundnut trade liberalization, the additional removal of 
distortions in value-added markets doubles net welfare gains in the African region via 
larger profits to groundnut producers, crushers, and exporters. China would also benefit 
from such trade liberalization on pure mercantilist grounds. Indeed, both farm and 
processing sectors would be better off. 
As a block, the OECD countries would experience welfare losses after full trade 
liberalization (moderate gains in the United States offset by consumer losses in the EU-
15, Canada, and Mexico). Mexico, Canada, and the EU-15 lose from the trade 
liberalization because they have limited distortions in these markets and are penalized by 
the price increases for the three products.  
Identifying globally superior policy options is not difficult. However, the feasibility 
of reforms depends on the power of vested interests and the ability of governments to 
identify trade-offs and politically feasible packages that will allow them to continue to 
pursue multiple goals in a more efficient manner. Based on our analysis, acceptable 
concessions could be struck that allow African members to benefit from liberalization of 
markets, such as groundnuts and cotton, while mitigating the withering of preferential 
treatments. For India, concessions on groundnuts could be offset by potential mercantilist 
gains in other agricultural markets (e.g., dairy) or in other sectors such as services and 
manufacturing.  
Our quantitative assessment has some limitations and abstractions from important 
problems. African producers need to reduce their export volatility through better water 
control (less dependence on rainfall) and higher efficiency in processing if they are to 
become dependable exporters in the context of global markets. Another limitation is that 
our modeling exercise did not address the cost of upgrading groundnut quality. Most 
developing-country exporters, except Argentina, face a “quality” challenge for meeting 
the requirements of the expanding confectionary markets and SPS requirements in OECD 
markets. Major challenges for developing countries include adapting research with an 
emphasis on yield but also on size and flavor, accessing fertilizer and pesticides, and 
controlling aflatoxin contamination. 
  
Endnotes 
1. The terms groundnuts and peanuts are synonymous. We use the latter to refer to U.S. 
markets and policies and the former for all other countries and their policies. We also 
use the terms cake and meal synonymously. 
2. The former U.S. peanut program had additional features but the essence of the 
program was constituted by the two components described in the introduction. See 
Skinner 1999 for a detailed description of the former peanut program. 
3. The negative impact of the former U.S. peanut policy on world prices may have been 
overstated as well (see Chvosta et al. 2003). 
4. These policies provide little incentive for expanding production because of 
unattractive administrative price levels and greater involvement of the private sector 
in marketing operations (FAO 1999). Data on levels of domestic support are not 
available, but Chinese agricultural economists report that it is minimal (see Diop, 
Beghin, and Sewadeh 2003 for sources). 
5. Taxation of producers was direct (i.e., when marketing boards or similar agencies 
captured a rent equal to the difference between net world price and the producer 
price) or indirect (via real exchange rate appreciation). This taxation was mitigated 
by input subsidies and border protection.  
6. We also ran a U.S. distortion removal scenario under existing trade distortions. We 
obtain a 0.13 percent increase in the world price of peanuts and virtually no increase 
in world cake and oil prices. U.S. peanut exports decrease by 10 percent or about 
20,000 mt. Hence unlike in the case of some other commodities subsidized by U.S. 
taxpayers and consumers (e.g., rice, cotton, sugar), the impact of the current U.S. 
peanut program on world prices and trade is nearly negligible. 
7. Africa-5 denotes our aggregate of the Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, and South 
Africa. 
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